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8 Envisioning solutions
Expert deliberation on environmental
futures
Vilja Varho and Katri Huutoniemi
1 Introduction
In the midst of various environmental, economic and social crises, a great
need exists for estimating future changes and designing policy for sustainable
development. Large-scale sustainability problems, such as climate change, are
complex in at least two levels. First, ‘ontological complexity’ (see Emmeche 2004)
refers to the way climate change, for example, results from a complex set of
interactions within a socio-ecological system, composed of subsystems and
internal variables and connected to various other socio-ecological systems (see
Ostrom 2009). Climate change research is complicated even if, in practice,
it cannot encompass the dynamics of the whole socio-ecological system but
operates from a particular frame of reference and usually on a smaller scale in
terms of time, location, or theme. In the search for solutions, interdisciplinarity
is called for. No single framework of knowledge could address the complex
dynamics of climate change, including the ecological, economic, social,
cultural and technological processes in which it is embedded.
The second source of complexity is problem framing. By this we refer to
the view that sustainability problems often cannot be deﬁned exactly. Instead,
there are many deﬁnitions, and each deﬁnition seems to carry a presup-
position of a solution. This type of problem has been called a ‘wicked’
problem (Rittel and Webber 1973). All problem deﬁnitions – as well as
the proposed solutions – are based on some values, interests and theoretical
assumptions. This complexity suggests that a multifaceted approach and
deliberation of alternative views is needed. As it is unlikely that there will be
a consensus about the best way to tackle a complex problem like climate
change, at least not in the available time frame, gathering, comparing and
combining various alternatives and viewpoints is crucial.
Another challenge to tackling complex sustainability problems is temporal.
Just mapping the present situation in terms of the various sources and drivers
of greenhouse gases, for example, is challenging. Uncertainties compound
when we introduce the temporal dimension and consider the future possibilities
of the system components. Many sustainability problems are deeply rooted in
the society, and changing current institutions, such as the patterns of energy
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production and consumption, will take considerable time. Futures studies is a
ﬁeld that can provide methods and tools for tackling this temporal challenge.
In this chapter, we discuss an approach widely used in futures studies,
expert deliberation, as a heuristic for envisioning solutions in the face of
complexity. Expert knowledge is used in various methodological applications
in futures studies and beyond. Often the goal has been to ﬁnd a consensus, for
example, in medical practices (e.g. Beers et al 1991; Fick et al. 2003), or to
forecast future development by using Delphi surveys or expert committees
(Aichholzer 2009). However, it is also used to create broader visions on
possible solutions (Amara 1981). In these applications, the aim of expert
deliberation is neither consensus nor accurate prediction of the future, but to
ﬁnd alternatives, consider possibilities, evaluate drivers and their interlinkages,
as well as inspire discussion. It is in this latter sense that expert deliberation
may be helpful in tackling wicked problems. Envisioning solutions is the ﬁrst
step of acting and reaching for solutions and therefore making the future.
The idea we develop in this chapter is that experts have, due to their prior
learning and experience, a great deal of knowledge and heuristic skills that
can provide sustainability analysts with a shortcut to future insight: Instead of
trying to analyze a number of factors and trends by using a complicated
theoretical apparatus, a researcher can tap into individual experts’ ability to
process complex information partly through intuition. In this framing, experts
are treated not primarily as authorities but as technically competent and inﬂu-
ential actors (Collins and Evans 2007), whose views shape our undertakings
and ultimately, possibilities, in the face of sustainability challenges.
In what follows, we review how expert deliberation is used in futures studies,
and in what ways it can be helpful in ﬁnding solutions to complex problems.
We then discuss expert deliberation as a heuristic process by drawing on the
literature on expertise as well as our own study of the future of transport
emissions. To make the most of experts’ heuristic capabilities, it is import to
consider how expertise is deﬁned, how expert panels are constructed, how
their deliberation is managed, and what prospects for sustainable solutions the
process yields. We illustrate these choices through a study where we used
expert deliberation to search for alternative, well-founded futures of transport
and its CO2 emissions in Finland up to the year 2050. We call our Delphi-
based scenario application Q2 scenarios, which is a mixed method combining
qualitative and quantitative techniques in expert deliberation (Varho and
Tapio 2013). In conclusion, we suggest that expert deliberation is a useful
heuristic for exploring and ‘scoping’ future solutions, on which there is, and
probably will be, no scientiﬁc or political consensus.
2 Expert deliberation in futures studies
Expert deliberation is employed in various ﬁelds, but it has ﬁrm roots in the
domain of futures studies. There cannot be factual knowledge about the
future of a society, because the future does not yet exist, and societal
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development is not pre-determined even if it strongly depends on choices
made today (de Jouvenel 1967). Just as the present or the past cannot be
exactly known, the future is not entirely unknown or indeterminate, albeit the
uncertainty is naturally greater. While we may consider it very probable that,
for example, air travel will stay popular in the coming decades, we cannot be
certain of the actual volume. In addition, surprises occur, such as the volcanic
eruption in Iceland that stopped much of the air travel in Europe for several
days in 2010. Visions and predictions of the future can also inﬂuence people’s
behaviour and either strengthen or weaken current tendencies, and thereby
conﬁrm or falsify the prediction (de Jouvenel 1967).
Thus, the purpose of futures studies is not so much to predict the future as
it is to open new possibilities, consider changes, trends and phenomena also
on longer time scales, and ﬁnd ways to navigate future decisions to a desirable
direction. Futures studies is organized around the assumption that the issues
it covers are contingent upon an inﬁnite number of interrelated factors, lack
‘objective’ properties, and will not be resolved by scientiﬁc inquiry. All of this
is signiﬁcant for sustainability studies as well. Futures studies methods are
targeted more at discovering sound ideas and alternative paths than justifying
them (Kuusi 1999), and thus oﬀer tools for looking for solutions to various
sustainability problems. Discussing possible futures is important, as views
about the future aﬀect the decisions made today.
Often a distinction is made between possible, probable and preferable
futures (Amara 1981). Experts were traditionally asked to estimate what would
be the most probable development. It is not necessarily business-as-usual, as
respondents could expect there to be considerable policy changes in the
future. However, experts can also be asked what they consider a preferable
future, that is, the best possible future the respondent can expect. This
distinction between preferable and probable futures increases markedly the
variation of views, and helps to identify obstacles to the realization of
the preferable future.
Expert deliberation outlines several possible paths, some of which are
more sustainable than others. But sustainability is not something that can
be conclusively deﬁned (see Frodeman, Chapter 11, this volume). Instead,
some emphasize certain aspects of it more than others. For example, it would
be possible to slow down climate change with very drastic measures, such as
banning private cars, but these might not be considered economically or
socially sustainable. By searching for views among the experts we can visua-
lize and bring to the scientiﬁc and public discussion alternative visions and
paths. In spite of the pluralistic view of the future, the discussion is ideally
rational in terms of both facts and values.
Various forms of expert deliberation in futures studies provide heuristic
schemes for approaching complex sustainability issues. Whereas consensus-
seeking methods are looking for one solution, scenario methods aim at widening
the range of options and enabling several alternative solutions. Scenarios are
alternative paths into the future and can be used, for instance, to inspire
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discussion or to support decision-making. There are, for example, individual
futurists’ heuristic scenarios. Experts also participate in interdisciplinary
teams, for example, in ‘what-if ’ modelling, and in transdisciplinary panels, as
in Delphi studies (Table 8.1).
Material for scenarios can be obtained from experts through various
means, such as scenario workshops, interviews, or the Delphi method. They
each have their pros and cons. Workshops, for example, allow the experts to
directly interact with one another. The Delphi method, on the other hand,
has the beneﬁt of preserving the anonymity of the experts. It means that
the arguments of the panellists are visible to everyone, but the identity of the
arguer is not. This is thought to encourage less conservative views, and
to decrease problems associated with group dynamics, such as the tendency to
stick to one’s ﬁrst stand, or to conform to answers from dominating persons
(e.g. Dalkey and Helmer 1963). As we will discuss later, expertise is partly a
social status granted by others, and the anonymous treatment of participants
removes some of this from play. Even if experts are selected for the panel
largely based on their socially deﬁned status, their arguments are treated
separately from it.
The Delphi method is an iterative process, which allows for deliberation
and for the experts to learn from one another. The Delphi method was
developed in the 1950s but has since experienced much variation. According
to Rowe and Wright (1999), its basic characteristics include anonymity,
iteration and controlled feedback, and these are likely to exist in all Delphi
applications. Rowe and Wright (1999) also mention statistical aggregation of
responses into a group response as a central characteristic, and originally the
Delphi method did have the object ‘to obtain the most reliable consensus of
opinion of a group of experts’ (Dalkey and Helmer 1963: 458). The hope was
that an expert group could provide a reasonably probable picture of the
future, although it was acknowledged that ‘it cannot even ideally be expected
that the ﬁnal responses will coincide, since the uncertainties of the future call
for intuitive probability estimates on the part of each respondent’ (Dalkey and
Helmer 1963: 459).
These types of applications still exist, for example, in technological forecasting
(see Aichholzer 2009), but many dissensus-based Delphi variants (Steinert













Desktop scenarios ‘What…if’ modelling Dissensus-based
Delphi
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2009) have increasingly rejected the idea of estimating probability and aimed
at ﬁnding diversity or assessing preferability (e.g., Kuusi 1999; Tapio 2003;
Varho and Tapio 2005, 2013). It is assumed that experts gather around
certain arguments and therefore a number of crystallized views rather than
consensus will be the outcome of the process (Rikkonen and Tapio 2009). The
‘intuitive estimates’ are no longer only about probabilities, as the preferred
development is also taken into account, but the pursuit of intuitive, experience-
based vision remains the heuristic behind the very idea of using experts in
Delphi panels.
The variety of views that emerge from a panel can be encouraged by using
suitable methods. Rafael Popper’s (2008) Foresight Diamond aggregates
dozens of methods that are used in futures studies and categorizes them
according to two dimensions: creativity vs. evidence and (individual) expertise
vs. interaction. The Diamond illustrates that not all desired properties can
be maximized at the same time. Choosing approaches that encourage
creativity, for example, may discourage experts from strictly evidence-based
reasoning. The Delphi method is situated in the middle of the Foresight
Diamond (almost equidistant from ‘evidence’ and ‘creativity’), but Popper
notes that it is increasingly used to explore normative possibilities. Imagining
the preferable future clearly requires more creativity than estimating the most
likely development.
Quantitative estimates about the future can also be obtained through
mathematical models. The beneﬁt in using expert deliberation is that it
enables access to the reasoning and heuristic capabilities of several individual
experts, instead of relying on a theoretical apparatus that follows a single,
predetermined logic for calculating the impacts of a given set of drivers on a
future state. Evolutionary psychologists (see Gigerenzer 2008) have even
emphasized that sometimes fast and frugal heuristics can beat other information
processing methods, especially when optimization through computational
methods is impossible or there is great uncertainty involved.
3 Expert deliberation as a heuristic process
As implied above, expert deliberation is often used in tasks that cannot be
successfully accomplished by any straightforward method. Long-term sus-
tainability challenges deﬁnitely belong to this category, and various
deliberative approaches are increasingly established in environmental social
science (e.g. Hajer 1995; Dryzek 1997). Expert views may be sought for
because they are believed to be both evidence-based and rational – they are
thus taken as best estimates of an uncertain issue, including future events. Some
other times, expert deliberation is implemented to support decision-making or
to legitimize particular political choices. We suggest, however, that expert
deliberation is valuable for reasons that are not widely discussed in the
context of sustainability studies. In particular, in cases where the scope and
number of potentially important factors are indeterminate, experts are worthy
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informants, or, perhaps more accurately, observers of information. In this
section, we discuss expert deliberation as a heuristic process that can
contribute to sustainability problem solving in a unique way. Particularly in
the more technical parts of this section, we draw from our deliberative study
on the future of transport.
3.1 Deﬁning expertise
Expertise is both cognitively and socially determined. Expertise as a cognitive
property refers to the acquired knowledge and skills possessed by an expert,
whereas expertise as a social property refers to the possession of an expert
status in the eyes of others. This distinction is important, because both
meanings of the concept matter for sustainability problem solving, but for
diﬀerent reasons.
From a cognitive perspective, expertise is the possession of substantive
knowledge of a domain of activity, including both propositional knowledge
and tacit knowledge. It is a characteristic of both individuals and com-
munities of practice, and it can be acquired through education, research,
experience, occupation, or any other form of cognitive reﬁnement. Acquiring
cognitive expertise is usually a matter of socialization into the practices of a
domain, but it is more than attribution by a social group. In this conception,
individuals may or may not possess expertise independently of whether others
think they possess it (Collins and Evans 2007: 3).
Even though the social status of an expert is often gained through
demonstrated competence in a given area, the acquisition of expert status is a
diﬀerent social process than the acquisition of cognitive expertise. Typically it
is formal degrees, higher professions and leading organizational positions that
give a person the status of an expert in a particular domain, and thereby
allow him or her to speak with authority (Saaristo 2000). While these
properties are considered to indicate that the person has the relevant
expertise, they do not guarantee it: the possession of expert status may
have little to do with the possession of real and substantive expertise, and
vice versa – a person without this status may possess similar skills to an
authorized expert.
A central characteristic of cognitive expertise is the ability to make
immediate, unreﬂective situational responses. According to the Dreyfuses’
phenomenological analysis (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005), intuitive judgement
is the hallmark of expertise: While ‘deliberation’ is certainly used by experts,
it is done for the purpose of improving intuition, not replacing it. This is
relevant here because in a targeted deliberation process experts are expected
to manage complex information relatively quickly, in minutes or hours rather
than weeks or years. They will need their own heuristics in order to deal with
uncertainty and make connections between various drivers, for example. Such
‘gut feeling’ and intuition are gained through prior activities and experience,
and are therefore aﬀected by education and ﬁeld-speciﬁc tacit knowledge.
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These heuristic capabilities can help in complex and ambiguous situations
where strict calculative rationality is not suﬃcient.
However, sustainability problem solving is not only about responding to
problems similar to what one has encountered before, based on current
knowledge. Instead, the experts need to consider various drivers and their
relations in diﬀering situations and to estimate long-term developments.
Automation and experience are necessary but not suﬃcient elements in
expert deliberation for future action. In envisioning, it is useful to be able to
accept the unexpected, and sometimes even abandon conventional wisdom.
Although these abilities can be learned through experience, they also
require an open-minded attitude and willingness to depart from one’s routine
heuristics.
The deﬁnition and criteria for expertise, that is, the skills that matter in a
domain of practice, are socially determined (Kaivo-oja et al. 1997; Turner
2001). The content of valid expertise is a contingent question that changes
over time, varies across cultures, and – most importantly – depends on
the problem at hand and how it is deﬁned. In sustainability issues, it is often
not certain just what kinds of expertise should be counted as relevant. The
question is important because those whose expertise is held relevant for a
problem gain power in deﬁning and framing the problem.
From a future-oriented perspective, expertise is socially signiﬁcant to the
extent that it can inﬂuence practice (Bogner and Menz 2009). Referring to
Beck’s (1992) conception of risk society, Bogner and Menz (2009) note that
what deﬁnes post-traditional experts is that they are, by virtue of their speciﬁc
knowledge, politically inﬂuential:
on the basis of speciﬁc knowledge that is derived from practice or
experience and which relates to a clearly demarcated range of problems,
[experts] have created a situation where it is possible for their interpreta-
tions to structure the concrete ﬁeld of action in a way that is meaningful
and guides action.
(Bogner and Menz 2009: 54)
This deﬁnition illustrates that expert knowledge is a subtle form of power and
thereby a vehicle for both maintaining and changing the existing patterns
of thought and action. Expertise is thus important from the point of view of
acting in the face of problems, rather than just describing or explaining them.
This is not to say that expertise alone has the power to determine future
development, but that experts are powerful stakeholders in deﬁning what is
real and possible in a society. Moreover, expert knowledge is not entirely
transparent or accessible to outsiders, nor is there a way to hold experts
accountable for the indirect power they exert when deﬁning phenomena.
An important aspect of expertise is the entanglement of objective and
subjective knowledge. Bogner and Menz (2009) consider expertise to consist
of (1) technical knowledge, typically knowledge that can be achieved through
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education; (2) process knowledge which refers to the practices and modes
of operation within a ﬁeld, including, for example, interaction routines,
organizational constellations and past events; and (3) interpretative knowledge
which refers to the expert’s subjective orientations, rules, viewpoints and inter-
pretations. This last dimension of expertise is knowledge that springs from the
person more clearly than the other two dimensions, and includes ideas,
ideologies and ‘fragmentary, inconsistent conﬁgurations of meaning and
patterns of explanation’ (Bogner and Menz 2009: 52). It implies that each
expert not only represents a particular domain or community of knowledge,
but is also an individual human being, a product of inherited characteristics
and a unique life history; even exactly the same education and job trajectory
could not create two identical experts.
Selinger and Crease (2002: 245) discuss subjectivity by emphasizing that
expertise is built upon the person, and the ‘prejudices, ideologies, hidden
agendas, or other forms of cultural embeddedness that person might have’ are
not miraculously shed during the process of becoming an expert. Although
such properties may have a negative connotation, it is through subjectivity that
many positive aspects of expertise come about: ethical consideration, empathy,
responsibility and many other valuable aspects of expert deliberation on future
solutions derive from experts’ ability to personally engage with sustainability
problems.
In expert deliberation, all aspects of expertise contribute to the heuristic
process. It is neither possible nor desirable to operate in a ‘vacuum’, as expert
knowledge is assimilated into personal interpretations, and reﬂects the societal
environment in which the expert operates. Not only the professional ﬁeld
or organizational position but also age, gender, nationality, or ethnicity can
aﬀect the content of expertise through shaping the conditions in which
individuals acquire their cognitive skills. The embeddedness of expertise in
context is visible also in the actions of deliberating experts themselves. Some
are more strict in controlling what they say, and try to stick to ‘facts’ as they
know them, others take on the role of a visionary more voluntarily and are
comfortable also making openly value-based judgements, particularly as long
as they are asked to distinguish between probable and preferable views.
In a project involving expert deliberation on future solutions to complex
problems, it is crucial to consider carefully how expertise is deﬁned. How
closely do we want to stick to traditional approaches that often lean towards
deﬁning expertise through social status and tend to support the status quo
of dominant types of expertise? In the face of complex challenges, increased
demands for inter- and transdisciplinary approaches have emerged (Huutoniemi
et al. 2010). In democratic societies, it is also considered important to give
voice to wider groups of people. Widening the deﬁnition of expertise itself is
called for, particularly with regard to understanding and solving problems
that involve ecological, economic and social aspects (e.g. Beck 1994; Saaristo
2000). This means recognizing the expertise beyond the establishment, or
‘counter-expertise’ that challenges the status quo (Irwin and Wynne 1996;
Expert deliberation on environmental futures 147
Template: Royal A, Font: ,
Date: 04/02/2014; 3B2 version: 9.1.406/W Unicode (May 24 2007) (APS_OT)
Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/TSS_RAPS/3b2/9780415855792.3d
Saaristo 2000). The increasing attention to the expertise of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) is illustrative of this tendency. At the same time, however,
failing to make any distinction between experts and non-experts may lead to
the development of a ‘technological populism’ under which ‘real’, cognitive
expertise would deserve no special respect (Collins and Evans 2007: 8).
3.2 Assembling an expert panel
The quality of expert deliberation depends to a great extent on the composition
of an expert panel. Panellists have to be selected on the basis of the research
question: what is considered relevant expertise for the task. If the objectives
are to ﬁnd solutions through diversity of views and share information from
various ﬁelds, it is important to be open to various kinds of expertise.
In futures studies, there have long been calls for plurality policy (Kuusi 1999:
181) in the expert panel construction (Linstone and Turoﬀ 1975; Vinnari 2008).
This usually refers both to the diversity of knowledge domains, including, for
example, technological, natural scientiﬁc and social scientiﬁc knowledge, and
to the diversity of organizations, such as universities, public administration,
business, or non-governmental organizations. Choosing experts according to
plurality policy enables taking more problem framings and solutions into
consideration. It is thus an essential ﬁrst step in envisioning solutions.
From a heuristic viewpoint, expertise is valuable precisely because it is not
‘neutral’. Established ﬁelds and organizations each have their own particular
expertise, but also their own ‘set of world-views and patterns of interpretation’
(Bogner and Menz 2001: 2). Expertise thus always includes ‘biases’, in the
sense that it rests on a particular way of interpreting the world and thereby
loses sight of alternative interpretations. Importantly, experts can be quite
ignorant of this blindness themselves. They may take certain axioms or
approaches as given, without realizing that there are alternative views. This is
why the diversity of expertise is particularly important when using expert
deliberation. Given the aim of rational communication, experts are expected
to critically consider their own views in the light of the arguments of others,
and the more variety there is in a panel, the more the experts are encouraged
to process new information (see Huutoniemi 2012).
Our application of Q2 scenarios provides an elaborated strategy for assem-
bling an expert panel by attempting to explicitly incorporate values, desires
and other personal or contextual aspects of expertise into the deliberation
process. The method is designed with a view to produce expert visions or
scenarios that rest on a wider and deeper knowledge than laypeople’s views
would be, but without assuming that factual knowledge alone could provide
solutions to ‘wicked’ problems that evade single deﬁnition. In addition to the
diversity of expertise as established in plurality policy, two other issues stand
out in identifying and assembling experts.
First, it seems useful to extend the boundaries of relevant expertise by
including also other than formal types of expertise in a narrowly deﬁned
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domain. Given the complexity of sustainability problems, the domains and
types of potentially relevant expertise are numerous. What may appear irre-
levant from a traditional perspective may turn out to be an important source
of new insight. This does not mean abandoning the concept of expertise, but
recognizing the various communities of practice that may have developed
their own understanding of an issue. Here the most important criterion
for ‘expertise’ is that a participant is a competent member of a network or
activity (cf. Collins and Evans 2007; Collins 2013), which enables him or
her to envisage aspects of future in a way that is both relevant for the issue at
hand and goes beyond ubiquitous public knowledge. In this view, relevant
expertise is seen to derive from particular stakeholder positions, not from
outside or above them.
In our project focusing on the climate policy of transport, an overwhelming
majority of the participants (ca. 80 per cent) were experts on the more
traditional scales of education and work experience. However, some did
not have the social status of an expert because, for example, they lacked
formal education in transport issues. As an extreme case, we included a high
school student who was interested in climate issues. An 18-year-old was
expected to have knowledge of young citizens’ everyday life and future
expectations, including their transport habits and values. As we were looking
approximately 40 years into the future, the views of today’s youth were con-
sidered particularly important. Collins (2013) discusses three dimensions of
expertise: ‘esotericity’, ‘accomplishment’ and ‘exposure to tacit knowledge
of a domain’. Although being a young Finnish citizen is hardly expertise
according to the ﬁrst two dimensions, it does fulﬁl the third dimension. Being
immersed in a subculture gives a person the ability to see and interpret the
world in ways that are not obvious to others.
Second, as discussed earlier, expertise also has a subjective dimension.
Although individual experts will always have something new to bring to the
panel, some personal properties matter more than others. In a future-oriented
study, it is important to pay attention to the participants’ attitude to change.
Some people rely more on past experiences, trends and conventional wisdom,
whereas others are more able to look out of the box, or are more sensitive
to weak signals of change (Mendonça et al. 2004) in the society. This means
that they are able to envision futures that are radically diﬀerent from today,
and help to open up visions and possibilities. Although these experts are
needed to ﬁnd new solutions, others may ﬁnd their views unrealistic. They
may also miss important knowledge that other experts have. If a vision lacks
credibility, it easily becomes ignored by others and lacks inﬂuence. Variation
of intellectual attitudes in a panel is helpful to encourage dialogue and
learning between diﬀerent stances.
An expertise matrix (introduced by Kuusi et al. 2006) is useful in ensuring
variation within the panel. The desired categories of variation are named in
the matrix, where each panellist is characterized. Any gaps are easily revealed
and new experts may be invited (Varho and Tapio 2013). In our project
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focusing on the climate policy of transport, the variety of expertise was
sought after by including experts from all transport modes, and from many
diﬀerent professional communities. There was also variation in education
level, background organization (e.g. administration, politics, business and
research), age and gender.
When focusing on the heuristic aspects of expert deliberation, however, an
expert matrix has clear limits. It is often impossible to know in advance
an expert’s attitude to change, for example, and thereby to ensure variation in
this aspect. Similarly, identifying relevant types of expertise or prioritizing
between them is an ambiguous task when confronting complex sustainability
problems. Almost any community may hold valuable knowledge or views.
3.3 Facilitating expert deliberation
Deliberation refers to communication between experts as well as to the
experts’ careful consideration. In a heuristic approach, it is done for
the purpose of improving intuition, not replacing it. For this purpose, we have
developed a Delphi-based technique we call ‘Q2 scenarios’, where the ‘Qs’
refer to the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in collecting
expert views (Varho and Tapio 2013). It aims at a kind of deliberation that is
compatible with the Habermasian ideal communication (Habermas 1981,
1982). The idea is that arguments count instead of arguers and that the
discussants respect and learn from each other. Actually, all expert methods
that include some sort of interaction include the opportunity to learn, and it
may be an important motive to participate in the process (Aichholzer 2009).
The connection between Delphi methods and Habermasian ideal com-
munication has been mentioned, for example, by Kuusi (1999), Tapio (2003),
Gould (2004) and Yetim (2009), but not explored in detail (Yetim and Turoﬀ
2004). While the concept of ideal communication refers mainly to discourse
ethics, it also provides a basis for enhancing experts’ thinking and problem
solving in societal contexts. In the following, we illustrate the facilitation of
expert deliberation by using our experience of Q2 scenarios as an example.
We posed wide-ranging questions that involved numerous possible variables
and required a consideration of a large number of drivers. For example, we
asked how the volumes of passenger transport in various modes would evolve
over the next 40 years. The factors inﬂuencing the outcome relate to popula-
tion growth and ageing, economic structure and volume, work culture, trans-
port infrastructure, people’s values, transport policy choices, and so on; the
experts were expected to use their knowledge, experience and intuition to
come up with quantitative estimates. The estimates were approximate, but
numerical responses produced data that could easily be compared and
understood by other experts (Tapio et al. 2011).
The experts were asked to provide both a probable and a preferable future
image. This approach does not only accept but fully embraces the subjectivity
of experts. While this distinction is regularly made in futures studies to serve
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various purposes (see Section 2), we emphasize its heuristic functions: it helps
the experts to recognize their own preferences and situate them among a
broader set of interests and values.
After having ﬁlled the quantitative questionnaire, experts were asked to give
reasons for their estimates and address a set of qualitative themes in personal
interviews. Interviews also provided the experts with an opportunity to discuss
topics that had not been asked about. Quantitative and qualitative responses
provided input for the second, extended questionnaire. It showed the panel-
lists’ anonymous answers to the ﬁrst questionnaire, and was accompanied
by a compilation of qualitative arguments for the answers. Each panellist
was asked to take a look at the responses before answering the second
questionnaire. The second round oﬀered each panellist the opportunity to
learn from each other and on that basis, change his or her answer. Together
with the interviews, the two-round Delphi process ensured that the scope of
expert deliberation was not limited to the problem as initially deﬁned by the
researchers.
In comparison to a traditional Delphi process, the Q2 scenario method
allows for more individuality in deliberation, and for each expert to rely on
their own modes of thinking and communicating their thoughts. For example,
an expert panel may include participants who know the matter under study
very well, but are unwilling or unable to oﬀer quantitative estimates; inter-
views are a way to incorporate their expertise into the envisioning process.
The combination of numerical, verbal and visual elements can also be
helpful. For example, the questionnaire we used in our study was sent in MS
Excel ﬁle format, displaying past trends as graphical representations. When
a respondent gave his or her estimate about a future value, the programme
immediately showed the answer in the graph. This type of feedback can help
visually oriented experts to give estimates, even if they are not very comfortable
with numbers.
While the Q2 scenario method involves techniques that inspire experts’ own
reasoning, the depth of communication between experts was fairly limited in
our case. There was no guarantee that the panellists actually considered the
views of the other panellists, although the material was given to them. In
general, if the range of expertise in a panel is wide, the argumentation of one
expert does not necessarily meet that of the others, leaving the deliberation of
issues thin (Huutoniemi 2012). More profound communication would be
needed to overcome this challenge. For example, the deliberation process could
be extended to include expert workshops where the results are discussed and
elaborated on (see e.g. Rikkonen and Tapio 2009; Levänen and Hukkinen
2013). At this stage, however, the anonymity would have to be abandoned,
and the issues stemming from group dynamics would complicate the process.
For example, some respondents might feel threatened by the various types of
expertise, reject them as inappropriate, or simply take them at face value (for
trust and dialogue in social dynamics, see Paloniemi and Vainio, Chapter 9,
this volume). On the other hand, opening the process to a face-to-face
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deliberation would enable the invitation of new participants and stakeholders
into the discussion.
3.4 Looking for solutions
When expert deliberation is employed in exploring solutions, there must be an
initial problem or problem situation for which the experts are to respond.
With complex sustainability issues, deﬁning the problem is obviously diﬃcult,
as there is a persistent ambiguity about the nature of the problem. It is thus
important to leave each expert enough room for the redeﬁnition of the
problem. In our study, the large CO2 emissions from transport were con-
sidered the initial problem. While this framing in itself set some boundaries
to the problem under consideration, it allowed for multiple views on an
appropriate target level of the emissions and for multiple strategies to reduce
the emissions; these were left to the experts to deﬁne. The interviews, in
particular, gave room for the experts to bring up other related problems,
drivers and viewpoints.
In addition to ﬂexibility in problem framing, insightful solutions were
probed by asking experts to describe both a probable and a preferable future
(Amara 1981). The probable future refers simply to the future image the panellist
considers most likely. The preferable future, in turn, refers to the panellist’s
preferred future image among the many futures he or she considers possible
in terms of technological, economic, political, social, ecological and other
constrictions. This future image is personal and value-laden, as what one
person considers preferable might not be at all preferable to another.
An example of the variety that can result from diﬀerent starting points was
the way in which diﬀerent experts created their future images in the transport
case. Most of the experts looked at the past trends and started from the
present, considering mainly how people move today, and how they may wish
to move in the future. They usually estimated that transport policies will
change travel behaviour to more sustainable modes to some extent, while the
emission targets will not be met. Even these views had great variety in terms
of assumed emission reductions. Others started from the premise that CO2
emissions have to be cut by a very large percentage, and that any policies
necessary for such a change would be implemented. The resulting future
images diﬀered drastically. This variation may imply diﬀerent assumptions on
sustainability. Some experts emphasized the individual need or right for
mobility as a part of economic or social sustainability (see also Banister,
Chapter 4, this volume), whereas others emphasized environmental dimensions
and preferred a future where emission targets are met, even if it meant radical
changes to mobility patterns. The latter respondents seemed to transform the
problem from ‘how much and how to reduce the emissions from transport’ to
‘what would a low-emission transport system look like’.
Expert deliberation can make such diﬀerences visible without aiming for a
single solution. Alternative future paths can be used to provoke discussion, to
152 Vilja Varho and Katri Huutoniemi
Template: Royal A, Font: ,
Date: 04/02/2014; 3B2 version: 9.1.406/W Unicode (May 24 2007) (APS_OT)
Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/TSS_RAPS/3b2/9780415855792.3d
inﬂuence policy and practice, or to guide future research (see also Tapio et al.,
Chapter 5, this volume). Since our study included the goal to communicate
the results to transport decision makers and the public, we organized the data
into a set of diﬀerent scenarios. For this purpose, the data was condensed
through cluster analysis of the second round questionnaire responses (see
e.g. Everitt et al. 2001) and through qualitative directed content analysis of
the interviews (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). These produced alternative future
states of various qualitative and quantitative variables. For example, we had
numerical estimates about the volume of passenger car use in 2050, as well as
qualitative estimates about the kind of cars that would become fashionable.
The alternative future states of variables were used to create a number of
diﬀerent scenarios. Results were presented as written scenario descriptions
as well as graphs depicting the numerical variables. Combining qualitative
and quantitative information in reporting makes the scenarios more useful in
decision-making and public discourse, because it allows for comparison
between diﬀerent scenarios and between the scenarios and other material,
such as emission targets, without losing sight of the assumptions behind each
scenario (see Varho and Tapio 2013).
In our study, the diﬀerent expert views and the scenarios that were constructed
from them were not always ‘solutions’ to the CO2 problem. Even the preferable
future images of many experts included relatively high emissions, because these
experts considered it impossible to reach strict emission targets, although all
participants shared the view that emissions must and can be cut. However,
considering the drivers and possibilities of change is the ﬁrst step in ﬁnding
solutions. Further steps may include the integration of these scenarios with
other, more strictly solution-oriented futures studies methods. For example, the
heuristic future images produced in our study were used in a backcasting (see
Robinson 1990) project where researchers selected and listed policy packages
and calculated with mathematical modelling how the end states of the scenarios
could be attained (Tuominen et al. 2012; Tuominen et al. forthcoming). In
this way heuristic methods and calculative methods can complement each other.
4 Conclusions
Solutions to sustainability problems lie in the future, even if action needs to
be taken now. The concepts and methods developed in futures studies can
therefore be helpful. The Delphi method and other techniques for expert
deliberation used to aim at ﬁnding the best solution, but are now also used for
stimulating, searching and organizing ideas. This tendency is compatible with
the current understanding of the complexity of societal problems. In the lack
of common deﬁnition of problems or shared value frameworks in which to
consider solutions, expert deliberation can be used to pin down alternative
views. When we look into the future and consider things that by deﬁnition do
not yet exist, we also need societal imagination and heuristics along with
more conventional and objective knowledge.
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This chapter has discussed expert deliberation as a heuristic process and
addressed ways to engage experts’ special capabilities in processing complex
information in a purposeful manner. In particular, we have focused on expert
insight as a vehicle for tackling sustainability problems that are embedded in
highly complex socio-environmental systems and are diﬃcult to solve or even
to deﬁne conclusively. Expert deliberation can contribute to sustainability
problem solving by considering possibilities, opening our minds to alternative
visions, evaluating drivers of future development, observing and comparing
alternatives, and inspiring broader discussion on possibilities and paths for a
sustainable future. To make the most of the experts’ competence on such tasks,
we have stressed the importance of identifying relevant types of expertise,
ensuring a variety of experts in a panel, and facilitating the deliberation pro-
cess in an appropriate manner.
Knowledge, experience and heuristic capabilities intertwine. But so do
expertise and power. Experts were deﬁned in this chapter to be inﬂuential
actors, whose views matter for at least two reasons. First, expert knowledge
does not only reﬂect the world ‘out there’, but actively shapes the reality, or
speciﬁc domains of it, and creates possibilities for action in these domains (see
Law 2004). Second, sustainability problems may be rooted in the existing
patterns of thought and practice which are partly maintained by expert sys-
tems. Systematic scrutiny and critical reﬂection on these patterns is important
for envisioning sustainable solutions. This can be accomplished through an
anonymous, iterative Delphi process where alternative patterns of thought are
revealed and diﬀerent experts are encouraged to learn from one another.
At the same time, expert deliberation involves heuristic elements that
cannot be made transparent or fully accounted for. Plurality policy in choos-
ing experts in a panel, as well as facilitation towards ideal communication,
create conditions for critical self-reﬂection, but do not hold experts res-
ponsible for their insights. Embracing expert intuition is, however, crucial for
eﬀective problem solving, even though it may depart from both the calcula-
tive rationality of scientiﬁc inquiry, on the one hand, and from the ideal of
transparency and accountability in political decision-making, on the other
hand. Expert deliberation is not just a method for anticipating the future, but,
most importantly, the ﬁrst step in ﬁnding ways towards a better future. In this
view, expert deliberation should maximize problem solving and pin down
alternative visions, whereas political choices should be left to the whole
society. In the future, more attention should be paid to how to bring the var-
ious views, scenarios and other yields of expert deliberation into public use in
a fruitful way.
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